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dc.contributor.authorBordignon, Massimoen_US
dc.contributor.authorTabellini, Guidoen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-04-20en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:49:21Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:49:21Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26645-
dc.description.abstractWe compare single ballot vs dual ballot elections under plurality rule, assuming sincere voting and allowing for partly endogenous party formation. Under the dual ballot, the number of parties is larger but the influence of extremist voters on equilibrium policy is smaller, because their bargaining power is reduced compared to a single ballot election. The predictions on the number of parties and on policy volatility are consistent with data on municipal elections in Italy, where cities with more (less) than 15,000 inhabitants have dual (single) ballots respectively.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper 2600en_US
dc.subject.jelH71en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordRun-offen_US
dc.subject.keywordmunicipal electionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordpolitical bargainingen_US
dc.subject.keywordpropertyen_US
dc.subject.stwWahlen_US
dc.subject.stwAbstimmungsregelen_US
dc.subject.stwWahlverhaltenen_US
dc.subject.stwRadikalismusen_US
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungenen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwKommunalwahlen_US
dc.subject.stwItalienen_US
dc.titleModerating political extremism: single round vs runoff elections under plurality ruleen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn597824134en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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