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dc.contributor.authorChoi, Jay Pilen_US
dc.contributor.authorGerlach, Heiko A.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-04-20en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:49:20Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:49:20Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26644-
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes international antitrust enforcement when multinational firms operate in several markets with antitrust authorities in each market. We are concerned with how the sustainability of collusion in one local market is affected by the existence of collusion in other markets when they are linked by demand relationships. The interdependence of collusion sustainability across markets leads to potential externalities in antitrust enforcement across jurisdictions. As a result, cartel prosecution can have a domino effect with the desistance of one cartel triggering the internal break-up of the cartel in the adjacent market. We further find that the equilibrium in antitrust authorities' enforcement decisions may exhibit non-linearity due to a free-rider problem as the global economy is more integrated. We also analyze the equilibrium antitrust enforcement and compare it with the globally optimal antitrust enforcement policy.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper 2599en_US
dc.subject.jelD41en_US
dc.subject.jelF1en_US
dc.subject.jelL13en_US
dc.subject.jelL41en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordCollusionen_US
dc.subject.keywordantitrust enforcementen_US
dc.subject.keywordmulti-market contacten_US
dc.subject.stwKonzentrationspolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwWettbewerbspolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwInternationalen_US
dc.subject.stwNationalstaaten_US
dc.subject.stwMultinationales Unternehmenen_US
dc.subject.stwGleichgewichtstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleInternational antitrust enforcement and multi-market contacten_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn597823669en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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