Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26633
Authors: 
Haupt, Alexander
Uebelmesser, Silke
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo working paper 2588
Abstract: 
We analyse how institutional and political decisions are intertwined. Citizens who differ in their mobility and ability vote first on labour market integration and afterwards on education policy. The institutional decision on integration influences the succeeding education policy. More surprisingly, the prospect of voting on education policy also affects the preceding integration decision. There are incentives for citizens to vote strategically for the institutional setting in which their preferred education policy is more successful at the polls. We show how a 'joint' analysis of the institutional and political decision alters the results compared to an 'isolated' analysis of either of the two decisions. Also, we explore how the two-dimensional heterogeneity of the citizens shapes the voting equilibrium in our setting with sequential voting.
Subjects: 
Voting
labour-market integration
education policy
migration
JEL: 
D72
F22
H52
I28
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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