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ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26619
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| Title: | | Agency and communication in IMF conditional lending: theory and empirical evidence  |
| Authors: | | Marchesi, Silvia Sabani, Laura Dreher, Axel |
| Issue Date: | | 2009 |
| Series/Report no.: | | CESifo working paper 2574 |
| Abstract: | | We focus on the role that the transmission of information between a multilateral (the IMF) and a country has for the optimal design of conditional reforms. Our model predicts that when agency problems are especially severe, and/or IMF information is valuable, a centralized control is indeed optimal. To the contrary, when local knowledge is more important than the agency bias we expect delegation to dominate. Controlling for economic and political factors, our empirical tests show that the number of IMF conditions is lower in countries with a greater social complexity, while it increases with the bias of the countries' authorities, openness, and transparency, consistently with the theory. |
| Subjects: | | IMF conditionality delegation communication panel data |
| JEL: | | C23 D82 F33 N2 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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