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dc.contributor.authorKrasa, Stefanen_US
dc.contributor.authorPolborn, Mattiasen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-03-04en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:48:51Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:48:51Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26605-
dc.description.abstractWe introduce a framework of electoral competition in which voters have general preferences over candidates' characteristics and policies. Candidates' immutable characteristics (such as gender, race or previously committed policy positions) are exogenously differentiated, while candidates can choose any policy for the remaining issues to maximize their winning probability. Voters have general preferences over the vectors of candidate characteristics and policies, and vote sincerely. Candidates are uncertain about the distribution of voter preferences. We characterize a condition on voter preferences (satisfied in most existing models) under which candidates' equilibrium policies generically converge. In contrast, for voter preferences that violate this condition, we construct a class of models in which policy divergence arises in the unique and strict Nash equilibrium. As a normative criterion, we define competition-efficiency and provide conditions under which the equilibrium is or is not competition-efficient.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper 2560en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.jelD60en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordMultidimensional policyen_US
dc.subject.keywordvotingen_US
dc.subject.keywordissue ownershipen_US
dc.subject.keywordnormative analysis of political competitionen_US
dc.subject.stwWahlkampfen_US
dc.subject.stwWahlverhaltenen_US
dc.subject.stwPräferenztheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwÖkonomische Theorie der Demokratieen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titlePolitical competition between differentiated candidatesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn592902293en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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