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dc.contributor.authorBellettini, Giorgioen_US
dc.contributor.authorCeroni, Carlotta Bertien_US
dc.contributor.authorPrarolo, Giovannien_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-03-04en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:48:46Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:48:46Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26598-
dc.description.abstractUsing data on a panel of 56 democratic countries in the period 1975-2004, we find evidence of a negative association between political stability and economic growth which is stronger and empirically more robust in countries with high bureaucratic costs. Motivated by these results, which contrast with previous contributions, we develop a model of growth with quality improvements where political connections with long-term politicians can be exploited by low-quality producers to defend their monopoly position and prevent innovation and entry of high-quality competitors. This requires that the incumbent politician remains in office and that the red-tape cost advantage granted by political connections is large relative to the quality upgrade related to innovation. Consistently with our empirical findings, the model delivers a negative association between the probability that the incumbent politician remains in office and average economic growth in the presence of high bureaucratic costs.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper 2553en_US
dc.subject.jelO43en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordPolitical persistenceen_US
dc.subject.keywordgrowthen_US
dc.subject.keywordinnovationen_US
dc.subject.stwInteressenpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwKorporatismusen_US
dc.subject.stwFolgekostenen_US
dc.subject.stwPolitische Stabilitäten_US
dc.subject.stwWirtschaftswachstumen_US
dc.subject.stwDemokratieen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwWelten_US
dc.titlePolitical persistence, connections and economic growthen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn592901343en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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