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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 2536
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper investigates the domestic government's antidumping duty choice in an asymmetric information framework where the foreign firm's cost is observed by the domestic firm, but not by the government. To induce truthful revelation, the government can design a tariff schedule, contingent on firms' cost reports, accompanied by a threat of auditing and implementing penalty duties. We show that the antidumping framework within GATT/WTO may not only offer the means to pursue strategic trade policy disguised as fair trade policy, but may also help overcome the informational problems with regard to determining the optimal strategic trade policy.
Schlagwörter: 
Antidumping duties
asymmetric information
trade protection
strategic trade policy
JEL: 
F12
F13
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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