EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26581
  
Title:Antidumping as strategic trade policy under asymmetric information PDF Logo
Authors:Matschke, Xenia
Schöttner, Anja
Issue Date:2009
Series/Report no.:CESifo working paper 2536
Abstract:This paper investigates the domestic government's antidumping duty choice in an asymmetric information framework where the foreign firm's cost is observed by the domestic firm, but not by the government. To induce truthful revelation, the government can design a tariff schedule, contingent on firms' cost reports, accompanied by a threat of auditing and implementing penalty duties. We show that the antidumping framework within GATT/WTO may not only offer the means to pursue strategic trade policy disguised as fair trade policy, but may also help overcome the informational problems with regard to determining the optimal strategic trade policy.
Subjects:Antidumping duties
asymmetric information
trade protection
strategic trade policy
JEL:F12
F13
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
592831612.PDF371.29 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26581

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.