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dc.contributor.authorWhalley, Johnen_US
dc.contributor.authorYu, Junen_US
dc.contributor.authorZhang, Shunmingen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-02-26en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:48:27Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:48:27Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26571-
dc.description.abstractWe explore how outcomes of trade policy retaliation (Nash tariff games) are affected when trade simultaneously takes places geographically across countries and through time via financial intermediation. In such models deficits and surpluses in goods trade are endogenously determined, and retaliatory trade policy towards goods can affect these and monetary trade models show different retaliatory trade outcomes from conventional goods only models. We use a general equilibrium goods trade model which also captures trade through time in the form of inside money as used in macro literature on one good overlapping generations models. In this model the deficit or surplus of any country in goods trade is endogenous determined. Optimal trade policy differs from that in a conventional goods only trade model in that countries which run trade deficits in goods will have more strategic power through tariff policy (and surplus countries less) than in models with balanced trade. We calibrate such a model to China's trade with the rest of the world and explore two country tariff games using 2005 data. Results show the significant impacts on Nash outcomes of endogenizing the Chinese trade surplus in the model in this way.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper 2526en_US
dc.subject.jelF13en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordInside moneyen_US
dc.subject.keywordgeneral equilibriumen_US
dc.subject.keywordNash equilibriumen_US
dc.subject.keywordnumerical analysisen_US
dc.subject.keywordtariff rateen_US
dc.subject.stwRetorsionsmaßnahmeen_US
dc.subject.stwZolltarifen_US
dc.subject.stwAußenwirtschaftstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwAllgemeines Gleichgewichten_US
dc.subject.stwGelden_US
dc.subject.stwFinanzintermediären_US
dc.subject.stwOverlapping Generationsen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwZollpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwNash-Gleichgewichten_US
dc.subject.stwChinaen_US
dc.titleTrade retaliation in a monetary-trade modelen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn592668819en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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