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ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
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| Title: | | Electoral control when policies are for sale  |
| Authors: | | Farvaque, Etienne Lagadec, Gaël |
| Issue Date: | | 2009 |
| Series/Report no.: | | CESifo working paper 2522 |
| Abstract: | | This article analyses the dynamics of electoral promises, building on an electoral competition model with endogenous policies. It extends the Grossman-Helpman (1994) model [Grossman G., Helpman E. [1994], Protection for sale, American Economic Review, 84, 4, 833-850] to include sanctions from the electorate and lobbies when the incumbent does not satisfy the expected performance she promised to deliver. This framework allows to deal with the intertemporal dimension needed to understand the prevalent cycle of promises, disappointment, new promises, new disappointment. |
| Subjects: | | Lobbies promises elections electoral competition lies |
| JEL: | | D72 P16 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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