Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/26545 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 2500
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
I analyze how lack of commitment affects the maturity structure of sovereign debt. Governments balance benefits of default induced redistribution and costs due to income losses in the wake of a default. Their choice of short- versus long-term debt affects default and rollover decisions by subsequent policy makers. The equilibrium maturity structure is shaped by revenue losses on inframarginal units of debt that reflect the price impact of these decisions. The model predicts an interior maturity structure with positive gross positions and a shortening of the maturity structure when debt issuance is high, output low, or a cross default more likely. These predictions are consistent with empirical evidence.
Subjects: 
Debt
maturity structure
no commitment
default
JEL: 
E62
F34
H63
Document Type: 
Working Paper
Appears in Collections:

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.