|
EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26534
|
| | |
| Title: | | Selfish and prospective: theory and evidence of pocketbook voting  |
| Authors: | | Elinder, Mikael Jordahl, Henrik Poutvaara, Panu |
| Issue Date: | | 2008 |
| Series/Report no.: | | CESifo working paper 2489 |
| Abstract: | | We present and test a theory of prospective and retrospective pocketbook voting. Focusing on two large reforms in Sweden, we establish a causal chain from policies to sizeable individual gains and losses and then to voting. The Social Democrats proposed budget cuts affecting parents with young children before the 1994 election, but made generous promises to the same group before the 1998 election. Since parents with older children were largely unaffected we use a difference-in-differences strategy for identification. We find clear evidence of prospective pocketbook voting. Voters respond to campaign promises but not to the later implementation of the reforms. |
| Subjects: | | Elections economic voting pocketbook voting self-interest prospective voting retrospective voting child care |
| JEL: | | C21 D72 H50 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
|
| |
| | |
Download bibliographical data as:
BibTeX
|
| |
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26534
|
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|