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Title:Selfish and prospective: theory and evidence of pocketbook voting PDF Logo
Authors:Elinder, Mikael
Jordahl, Henrik
Poutvaara, Panu
Issue Date:2008
Series/Report no.:CESifo working paper 2489
Abstract:We present and test a theory of prospective and retrospective pocketbook voting. Focusing on two large reforms in Sweden, we establish a causal chain from policies to sizeable individual gains and losses and then to voting. The Social Democrats proposed budget cuts affecting parents with young children before the 1994 election, but made generous promises to the same group before the 1998 election. Since parents with older children were largely unaffected we use a difference-in-differences strategy for identification. We find clear evidence of prospective pocketbook voting. Voters respond to campaign promises but not to the later implementation of the reforms.
Subjects:Elections
economic voting
pocketbook voting
self-interest
prospective voting
retrospective voting
child care
JEL:C21
D72
H50
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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