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EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26521
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Dur, Robert | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Sol, Joeri | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2009-01-15 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2009-07-28T08:47:50Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2009-07-28T08:47:50Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2008 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26521 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | Social interaction with colleagues is an important job attribute for many workers. To attract and retain workers, managers therefore need to think about how to create and preserve high-quality co-worker relationships. This paper develops a principal-multi-agent model where agents do not only engage in productive activities, but also in social interaction with their colleagues, which in turn creates co-worker altruism. We study how financial incentives for productive activities can improve or damage the work climate. We show that both team incentives and relative incentives can help to create a good work climate. We discuss some empirical evidence supporting these predictions. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | CESifo München | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | CESifo working paper 2476 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D86 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | J41 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | M50 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Social interaction | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | altruism | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | incentive contracts | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | co-worker satisfaction | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Betriebsklima | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Gruppenarbeit | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Altruismus | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Leistungsanreiz | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Arbeitszufriedenheit | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Agency Theory | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Social interaction, co-Worker altruism, and incentives | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 589388924 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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