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dc.contributor.authorDur, Roberten_US
dc.contributor.authorSol, Joerien_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-15en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:47:50Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:47:50Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26521-
dc.description.abstractSocial interaction with colleagues is an important job attribute for many workers. To attract and retain workers, managers therefore need to think about how to create and preserve high-quality co-worker relationships. This paper develops a principal-multi-agent model where agents do not only engage in productive activities, but also in social interaction with their colleagues, which in turn creates co-worker altruism. We study how financial incentives for productive activities can improve or damage the work climate. We show that both team incentives and relative incentives can help to create a good work climate. We discuss some empirical evidence supporting these predictions.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper 2476en_US
dc.subject.jelD86en_US
dc.subject.jelJ41en_US
dc.subject.jelM50en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordSocial interactionen_US
dc.subject.keywordaltruismen_US
dc.subject.keywordincentive contractsen_US
dc.subject.keywordco-worker satisfactionen_US
dc.subject.stwBetriebsklimaen_US
dc.subject.stwGruppenarbeiten_US
dc.subject.stwAltruismusen_US
dc.subject.stwLeistungsanreizen_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitszufriedenheiten_US
dc.subject.stwAgency Theoryen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleSocial interaction, co-Worker altruism, and incentivesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn589388924en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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