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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/26521
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Dur, Robert | en |
dc.contributor.author | Sol, Joeri | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-15 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-07-28T08:47:50Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-07-28T08:47:50Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2008 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26521 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Social interaction with colleagues is an important job attribute for many workers. To attract and retain workers, managers therefore need to think about how to create and preserve high-quality co-worker relationships. This paper develops a principal-multi-agent model where agents do not only engage in productive activities, but also in social interaction with their colleagues, which in turn creates co-worker altruism. We study how financial incentives for productive activities can improve or damage the work climate. We show that both team incentives and relative incentives can help to create a good work climate. We discuss some empirical evidence supporting these predictions. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunich | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aCESifo Working Paper |x2476 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D86 | en |
dc.subject.jel | J41 | en |
dc.subject.jel | M50 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Social interaction | en |
dc.subject.keyword | altruism | en |
dc.subject.keyword | incentive contracts | en |
dc.subject.keyword | co-worker satisfaction | en |
dc.subject.stw | Betriebsklima | en |
dc.subject.stw | Gruppenarbeit | en |
dc.subject.stw | Altruismus | en |
dc.subject.stw | Leistungsanreiz | en |
dc.subject.stw | Arbeitszufriedenheit | en |
dc.subject.stw | Agency Theory | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Social interaction, co-Worker altruism, and incentives | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 589388924 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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