Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/26505 
Kompletter Metadatensatz
Erscheint in der Sammlung:
DublinCore-FeldWertSprache
dc.contributor.authorFrydman, Carolaen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-12-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:47:38Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:47:38Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26505-
dc.description.abstractIn recent years, a large academic debate has tried to explain the rapid rise in CEO pay experienced over the past three decades. In this article, I review the main proposed theories, which span views of compensation as the result of a competitive labor market for executives to theories based on excess of managerial power. Some of these hypotheses have found support in cross-sectional evidence, but it has proven more difficult to determine which factors have caused the observed changes in pay over time. An alternative strategy is to evaluate the fit of plausible explanations out of sample by contrasting them with the evolution in executive pay and the market for managers during earlier time periods. A case study of General Electric suggests that evidence for earlier decades can speak to the recent trends and reveals the limitations of current explanations to address the long-run data.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x2460en
dc.subject.jelJ33en
dc.subject.jelM52en
dc.subject.jelN32en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordExecutive compensationen
dc.subject.keywordmanagerial incentivesen
dc.subject.keywordcorporate governanceen
dc.subject.keywordmarket for managersen
dc.subject.stwFührungskräfteen
dc.subject.stwGehalten
dc.subject.stwQualifikationen
dc.subject.stwWettbewerben
dc.subject.stwCorporate Governanceen
dc.subject.stwGeschichteen
dc.subject.stwUSAen
dc.titleLearning from the past: trends in executive compensation over the twentieth century-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn589229532en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
149.41 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.