Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26505
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dc.contributor.authorFrydman, Carolaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-12en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:47:38Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:47:38Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26505-
dc.description.abstractIn recent years, a large academic debate has tried to explain the rapid rise in CEO pay experienced over the past three decades. In this article, I review the main proposed theories, which span views of compensation as the result of a competitive labor market for executives to theories based on excess of managerial power. Some of these hypotheses have found support in cross-sectional evidence, but it has proven more difficult to determine which factors have caused the observed changes in pay over time. An alternative strategy is to evaluate the fit of plausible explanations out of sample by contrasting them with the evolution in executive pay and the market for managers during earlier time periods. A case study of General Electric suggests that evidence for earlier decades can speak to the recent trends and reveals the limitations of current explanations to address the long-run data.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo working paper|x2460en_US
dc.subject.jelJ33en_US
dc.subject.jelM52en_US
dc.subject.jelN32en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordExecutive compensationen_US
dc.subject.keywordmanagerial incentivesen_US
dc.subject.keywordcorporate governanceen_US
dc.subject.keywordmarket for managersen_US
dc.subject.stwFührungskräfteen_US
dc.subject.stwGehalten_US
dc.subject.stwQualifikationen_US
dc.subject.stwWettbewerben_US
dc.subject.stwCorporate Governanceen_US
dc.subject.stwGeschichteen_US
dc.subject.stwUSAen_US
dc.titleLearning from the past: trends in executive compensation over the twentieth centuryen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn589229532en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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