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ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26500
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| Title: | | Enlargement versus deepening: the trade-off facing economic unions  |
| Authors: | | Lorz, Jens Oliver Willmann, Gerald |
| Issue Date: | | 2008 |
| Series/Report no.: | | CESifo working paper 2455 |
| Abstract: | | This paper analyzes the relationship between the size of an economic union and the degree of policy centralization. We consider a political economy setting in which elected representatives bargain about the degree of centralization within the union. In our model strategic delegation affects the identity of the representatives and hence the equilibrium policy outcome. We show that the relationship between the size of the union and centralization may be non-monotonic: Up to a certain size of the union enlargement leads to deeper integration, whereas beyond that size further enlargement implies less centralization. We also show that freezing the level of centralization or allowing an associated membership can mitigate the trade-off. |
| Subjects: | | Fiscal federalism policy centralization political economy |
| JEL: | | D78 H77 H87 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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