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ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26498
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| Title: | | Market competition and lower tier incentives  |
| Authors: | | Theilen, Bernd |
| Issue Date: | | 2008 |
| Series/Report no.: | | CESifo working paper 2453 |
| Abstract: | | The relationship between competition and performance-related pay has been analyzed in single-principal-single-agent models. While this approach yields good predictions for managerial pay schemes, the predictions fail to apply for employees at lower tiers of a firm's hierarchy. In this paper, a principal-multi-agent model of incentive pay is developed which makes it possible to analyze the effect of changes in the competitiveness of markets on lower tier incentive payment schemes. The results explain why the payment schemes of agents located at low and mid tiers are less sensitive to changes in competition when aggregated firm data is used. |
| Subjects: | | Cournot competition contract delegation moral hazard entry market size wage cost |
| JEL: | | D82 J21 L13 L22 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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