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dc.contributor.authorBouckaert, Janen_US
dc.contributor.authorDegryse, Hansen_US
dc.contributor.authorProvoost, Thomasen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-12en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:47:30Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:47:30Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26494-
dc.description.abstractCompeting firms often have the possibility to jointly determine the magnitude of consumers' switching costs. Examples include compatibility decisions and the option of introducing number portability in telecom and banking. We put forward a model where firms jointly decide to reduce switching costs before competing in prices during two periods. We demonstrate that the outcome hinges crucially on how the joint action reduces consumers' switching costs. In particular, firms will enhance their market power if they implement measures that reduce consumers' switching costs by a lump sum. Conversely, they will preserve market power by not implementing actions that reduce switching costs proportionally. Hence, when policy makers design consumer protection policies, they should not always adopt a favourable attitude towards efforts by firms to reduce switching costs.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper 2449en_US
dc.subject.jelD43en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordSwitching costsen_US
dc.subject.keywordmarket poweren_US
dc.subject.keywordwelfareen_US
dc.subject.stwWechselkostenen_US
dc.subject.stwMarktmachten_US
dc.subject.stwPreiswettbewerben_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleEnhancing market power by reducing switching costsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn589197169en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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