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dc.contributor.authorDahlberg, Matzen_US
dc.contributor.authorLundqvist, Heléneen_US
dc.contributor.authorMörk, Evaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-11-11en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:32:20Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:32:20Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26475-
dc.description.abstractIn their role as agenda setters and implementers of political decisions, bureaucrats potentially have the power to influence decisions in their own favor. It is however difficult to empirically test whether bureaucrats actually are involved in such actions. In this paper we suggest and apply a new way of testing the hypothesis that bureaucrats can and do in fact affect policy to their own benefit. Making use of a discontinuity in the Swedish grant system, we estimate causal effects of intergovernmental grants on different types of personnel employed by the local governments. On the margin, we find a large, positive effect of grants on the number of bureaucrats in the central administration, but no effects on the number of personnel in other important sectors run by the local government (child care, schools and elderly care). These results support the view that bureaucrats are able to, and do indeed, affect the allocation of grants within municipalities to support own goals.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper 2430en_US
dc.subject.jelC33en_US
dc.subject.jelH11en_US
dc.subject.jelH70en_US
dc.subject.jelH83en_US
dc.subject.jelJ45en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordFiscal federalismen_US
dc.subject.keywordgrantsen_US
dc.subject.keywordbureaucratsen_US
dc.subject.keywordrent seekingen_US
dc.subject.keyworddiscontinuity analysisen_US
dc.subject.stwFinanzföderalismusen_US
dc.subject.stwFinanzausgleichen_US
dc.subject.stwKommunalverwaltungen_US
dc.subject.stwAllokationen_US
dc.subject.stwRent Seekingen_US
dc.subject.stwSchwedenen_US
dc.titleIntergovernmental grants and bureaucratic poweren_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn584694180en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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