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dc.contributor.authorLlense, Fabienneen_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-09-16en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:31:59Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:31:59Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26447-
dc.description.abstractIn the middle of the nineties, the sharp increase in globalisation and the last privatization wave have promoted the shaping of a market for executives in France. Characteristics of this market are estimated for France and a competitive model is simulated in order to assess to what extend such a model could explain the observed CEO compensations. The size elasticity of compensation in France is equal to 0.5 and justifies a large magnitude in compensation. To moderate those compensations, a wage cap is often called for by opinion and the European left but also, more surprisingly, by representative of shareholders. The cost of this policy is evaluated in this sorting model and the lobbying of shareholders is explained.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper 2402en_US
dc.subject.jelJ31en_US
dc.subject.jelJ33en_US
dc.subject.jelD33en_US
dc.subject.jelD41en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwFührungskräfteen_US
dc.subject.stwGehalten_US
dc.subject.stwVergütungssystemen_US
dc.subject.stwRegulierungen_US
dc.subject.stwWirtschaftspolitische Wirkungsanalyseen_US
dc.subject.stwFührungskräfteauswahlen_US
dc.subject.stwMatchingen_US
dc.subject.stwBetriebsgrößeen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwFrankreichen_US
dc.titleFrench CEO compensations: what is the cost of a mandatory upper limit?en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn577849034en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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