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Title:French CEO compensations: what is the cost of a mandatory upper limit? PDF Logo
Authors:Llense, Fabienne
Issue Date:2008
Series/Report no.:CESifo working paper 2402
Abstract:In the middle of the nineties, the sharp increase in globalisation and the last privatization wave have promoted the shaping of a market for executives in France. Characteristics of this market are estimated for France and a competitive model is simulated in order to assess to what extend such a model could explain the observed CEO compensations. The size elasticity of compensation in France is equal to 0.5 and justifies a large magnitude in compensation. To moderate those compensations, a wage cap is often called for by opinion and the European left but also, more surprisingly, by representative of shareholders. The cost of this policy is evaluated in this sorting model and the lobbying of shareholders is explained.
JEL:J31
J33
D33
D41
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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