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ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26446
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| Title: | | On myopia as rationale for social security  |
| Authors: | | Andersen, Torben M. Bhattacharya, Joydeep |
| Issue Date: | | 2008 |
| Series/Report no.: | | CESifo working paper 2401 |
| Abstract: | | This paper revisits the role played by myopia in generating a theoretical rationale for pay-as-you-go social security in dynamically efficient economies. Contrary to received wisdom, if the real interest rate is exogenously fixed, enough myopia may justify public pensions but never alongside positive private savings. With sufficient myopia, co-existence of positive optimal pensions and positive private saving is possible if the real interest rate on saving evolves endogenously, as in a model with a neoclassical technology. |
| Subjects: | | Myopia pensions social security dynamic efficiency |
| JEL: | | H55 E6 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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