EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26446
  
Title:On myopia as rationale for social security PDF Logo
Authors:Andersen, Torben M.
Bhattacharya, Joydeep
Issue Date:2008
Series/Report no.:CESifo working paper 2401
Abstract:This paper revisits the role played by myopia in generating a theoretical rationale for pay-as-you-go social security in dynamically efficient economies. Contrary to received wisdom, if the real interest rate is exogenously fixed, enough myopia may justify public pensions but never alongside positive private savings. With sufficient myopia, co-existence of positive optimal pensions and positive private saving is possible if the real interest rate on saving evolves endogenously, as in a model with a neoclassical technology.
Subjects:Myopia
pensions
social security
dynamic efficiency
JEL:H55
E6
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
577848798.PDF239.25 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26446

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.