Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26446
Authors: 
Andersen, Torben M.
Bhattacharya, Joydeep
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo working paper 2401
Abstract: 
This paper revisits the role played by myopia in generating a theoretical rationale for pay-as-you-go social security in dynamically efficient economies. Contrary to received wisdom, if the real interest rate is exogenously fixed, enough myopia may justify public pensions but never alongside positive private savings. With sufficient myopia, co-existence of positive optimal pensions and positive private saving is possible if the real interest rate on saving evolves endogenously, as in a model with a neoclassical technology.
Subjects: 
Myopia
pensions
social security
dynamic efficiency
JEL: 
H55
E6
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
239.25 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.