Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26434
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dc.contributor.authorHefeker, Carstenen_US
dc.contributor.authorZimmer, Blandineen_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-09-11en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:31:50Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:31:50Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26434-
dc.description.abstractThe paper examines the monetary-fiscal interactions in a monetary union model with uncertainty due to imperfect central bank transparency. We first show that monetary uncertainty disciplines fiscal policymakers and thereby reduces taxes, average inflation and output distortions. However, as more members enter the monetary union, the fiscal disciplining effect of uncertainty is mitigated. As a consequence, monetary union enlargement may lead to a more aggressive fiscal stance in some member countries, depending on their relative economic and political weights, on their government's spending target, and on the change in the degree of uncertainty that they experience with the enlargement.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo working paper|x2389en_US
dc.subject.jelE58en_US
dc.subject.jelE63en_US
dc.subject.jelF36en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwGeldpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwUnvollkommene Informationen_US
dc.subject.stwRisikoen_US
dc.subject.stwFinanzpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwEntscheidung bei Unsicherheiten_US
dc.subject.stwWährungsunionen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleUncertainty and fiscal policy in an asymmetric monetary unionen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn577510800en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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