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dc.contributor.authorKöthenbürger, Markoen_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-09-11en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:31:46Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:31:46Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26430-
dc.description.abstractPrevious literature widely assumes that taxes are optimized in local public finance while expenditures adjust residually. This paper endogenizes the choice of the optimization variable. In particular, it analyzes how federal policy toward local governments influences the way local governments decide on public policy. Unlike the presumption, the paper shows that local governments may choose to optimize over expenditures. The result most notably prevails when federal policy subsidizes local fiscal effort. The results offer a new perspective of the efficiency implications of federal policy toward local governments and, thereby, enable a more precise characterization of local government behaviour in fiscal federalism.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper 2385en_US
dc.subject.jelH7en_US
dc.subject.jelH3en_US
dc.subject.jelH1en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordTax vs expenditure optimizationen_US
dc.subject.keywordfederalismen_US
dc.subject.keywordendogenous commitmenten_US
dc.subject.keywordfiscal incentivesen_US
dc.subject.keywordpolicy interactionen_US
dc.subject.stwKommunale Finanzpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwFinanzföderalismusen_US
dc.subject.stwFinanzausgleichen_US
dc.subject.stwÖkonomischer Anreizen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleHow do local governments decide on public policy in fiscal federalism?: tax vs. expenditure optimizationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn577509829en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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