Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26430
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorKöthenbürger, Markoen_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-09-11en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:31:46Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:31:46Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26430-
dc.description.abstractPrevious literature widely assumes that taxes are optimized in local public finance while expenditures adjust residually. This paper endogenizes the choice of the optimization variable. In particular, it analyzes how federal policy toward local governments influences the way local governments decide on public policy. Unlike the presumption, the paper shows that local governments may choose to optimize over expenditures. The result most notably prevails when federal policy subsidizes local fiscal effort. The results offer a new perspective of the efficiency implications of federal policy toward local governments and, thereby, enable a more precise characterization of local government behaviour in fiscal federalism.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo working paper|x2385en_US
dc.subject.jelH7en_US
dc.subject.jelH3en_US
dc.subject.jelH1en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordTax vs expenditure optimizationen_US
dc.subject.keywordfederalismen_US
dc.subject.keywordendogenous commitmenten_US
dc.subject.keywordfiscal incentivesen_US
dc.subject.keywordpolicy interactionen_US
dc.subject.stwKommunale Finanzpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwFinanzföderalismusen_US
dc.subject.stwFinanzausgleichen_US
dc.subject.stwÖkonomischer Anreizen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleHow do local governments decide on public policy in fiscal federalism?: tax vs. expenditure optimizationen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn577509829en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

Files in This Item:
File
Size
236.43 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.