EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26399
  

Full metadata record

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorBlackburn, Keithen_US
dc.contributor.authorNeanidis, Kyriakos C.en_US
dc.contributor.authorHaque, M. Emranulen_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-09-08en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:31:24Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:31:24Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26399-
dc.description.abstractThis paper presents an analysis of the effect of bureaucratic corruption on economic growth through a public finance transmission channel. At the theoretical level, we develop a simple dynamic general equilibrium model in which financial intermediaries make portfolio decisions on behalf of agents, and bureaucrats collect tax revenues on behalf of the government. Corruption takes the form of the embezzlement of public funds, the effect of which is to increase the government's reliance on seigniorage finance. This leads to an increase in inflation which, in turn, reduces capital accumulation and growth. At the empirical level, we use data on 82 countries over a 20-year period to test the predictions of our model. Taking proper account of the government's budget constraint, we find strong evidence to support these predictions under different estimation strategies. Our results are robust to a wide range of sensitivity tests.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper 2354en_US
dc.subject.jelE6en_US
dc.subject.jelH6en_US
dc.subject.jelO16en_US
dc.subject.jelO17en_US
dc.subject.jelO42en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordCorruptionen_US
dc.subject.keywordseigniorageen_US
dc.subject.keywordinflationen_US
dc.subject.keywordgrowthen_US
dc.subject.stwKorruptionen_US
dc.subject.stwSteueraufkommenen_US
dc.subject.stwBetrugen_US
dc.subject.stwMünzgewinnen_US
dc.subject.stwInflationen_US
dc.subject.stwWirtschaftswachstumen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwSchätzungen_US
dc.subject.stwWelten_US
dc.titleCorruption, seigniorage and growth: theory and evidenceen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn577087983en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
577087983.PDF855.71 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Show simple item record
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.