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EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26396
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Cremer, Helmuth | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | de Donder, Philippe | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Maldonado, Darío | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Pestieau, Pierre | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2008-07-22 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2009-07-28T08:31:22Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2009-07-28T08:31:22Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2008 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26396 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | This paper shows that the combination of habit formation - present consumption creating additional consumption needs in the future - and myopia may explain why some retirees are forced to unretire, i.e., unexpectedly return to work. It also shows that when myopia about habit formation leads to unretirement there is a case for government's intervention. In a first-best setting the optimal solution can be decentralized by a simple Pigouvian (paternalistic) consumption tax (along with suitable lump-sum taxes). In a second-best setting, when personalized lump-sum transfers are not available, consumption taxes may have conflicting paternalistic and redistributive effects. We study the design of consumption taxes in such a setting when myopic individuals differ in productivity. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | CESifo München | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | CESifo working paper 2351 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D91 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | H21 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | H55 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Habit formation | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | myopia | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | unretiring | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Einkommenshypothese | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Konsum | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Risiko | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Altersgrenze | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Arbeitsangebot | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Verbrauchsteuer | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Habit formation and labor supply | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 57227565X | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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