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dc.contributor.authorCremer, Helmuthen_US
dc.contributor.authorde Donder, Philippeen_US
dc.contributor.authorMaldonado, Daríoen_US
dc.contributor.authorPestieau, Pierreen_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-07-22en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:31:22Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:31:22Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26396-
dc.description.abstractThis paper shows that the combination of habit formation - present consumption creating additional consumption needs in the future - and myopia may explain why some retirees are forced to unretire, i.e., unexpectedly return to work. It also shows that when myopia about habit formation leads to unretirement there is a case for government's intervention. In a first-best setting the optimal solution can be decentralized by a simple Pigouvian (paternalistic) consumption tax (along with suitable lump-sum taxes). In a second-best setting, when personalized lump-sum transfers are not available, consumption taxes may have conflicting paternalistic and redistributive effects. We study the design of consumption taxes in such a setting when myopic individuals differ in productivity.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper 2351en_US
dc.subject.jelD91en_US
dc.subject.jelH21en_US
dc.subject.jelH55en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordHabit formationen_US
dc.subject.keywordmyopiaen_US
dc.subject.keywordunretiringen_US
dc.subject.stwEinkommenshypotheseen_US
dc.subject.stwKonsumen_US
dc.subject.stwRisikoen_US
dc.subject.stwAltersgrenzeen_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitsangeboten_US
dc.subject.stwVerbrauchsteueren_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleHabit formation and labor supplyen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn57227565Xen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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