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Title:Yardstick competition, corruption, and electoral incentives PDF Logo
Authors:Long, Ngo Van
Sengupta, Bodhisattva
Issue Date:2008
Series/Report no.:CESifo working paper 2345
Abstract:This paper investigates the relationship between electoral incentives, institutions and corruption. We assume that voters use a yardstick criterion. The incumbent provides a public good and extracts rent, which are financed by imposing a distortionary tax. We demonstrate the possibility that yardstick competition itself fails to restrict rent seeking. We complement the static setting with a dynamic scenario where each incumbent politician faces an election after a finite, fixed term. Under relative performance evaluation, dynamic incentives impose more restriction on rent appropriation in comparison to the static case.
Subjects:Yardstick competition
public good
electoral incentives
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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