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EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26390
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Long, Ngo Van | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Sengupta, Bodhisattva | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2008-07-22 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2009-07-28T08:31:18Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2009-07-28T08:31:18Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2008 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26390 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | This paper investigates the relationship between electoral incentives, institutions and corruption. We assume that voters use a yardstick criterion. The incumbent provides a public good and extracts rent, which are financed by imposing a distortionary tax. We demonstrate the possibility that yardstick competition itself fails to restrict rent seeking. We complement the static setting with a dynamic scenario where each incumbent politician faces an election after a finite, fixed term. Under relative performance evaluation, dynamic incentives impose more restriction on rent appropriation in comparison to the static case. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | CESifo München | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | CESifo working paper 2345 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | H11 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | H73 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | H77 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Yardstick competition | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | rent-seeking | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | public good | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | electoral incentives | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Yardstick Competition | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Public Choice | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Rent Seeking | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Wahl | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Ökonomischer Anreiz | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Öffentliches Gut | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Yardstick competition, corruption, and electoral incentives | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 572270704 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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