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dc.contributor.authorLong, Ngo Vanen_US
dc.contributor.authorSengupta, Bodhisattvaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-07-22en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:31:18Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:31:18Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26390-
dc.description.abstractThis paper investigates the relationship between electoral incentives, institutions and corruption. We assume that voters use a yardstick criterion. The incumbent provides a public good and extracts rent, which are financed by imposing a distortionary tax. We demonstrate the possibility that yardstick competition itself fails to restrict rent seeking. We complement the static setting with a dynamic scenario where each incumbent politician faces an election after a finite, fixed term. Under relative performance evaluation, dynamic incentives impose more restriction on rent appropriation in comparison to the static case.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper 2345en_US
dc.subject.jelH11en_US
dc.subject.jelH73en_US
dc.subject.jelH77en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordYardstick competitionen_US
dc.subject.keywordrent-seekingen_US
dc.subject.keywordpublic gooden_US
dc.subject.keywordelectoral incentivesen_US
dc.subject.stwYardstick Competitionen_US
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen_US
dc.subject.stwRent Seekingen_US
dc.subject.stwWahlen_US
dc.subject.stwÖkonomischer Anreizen_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleYardstick competition, corruption, and electoral incentivesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn572270704en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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