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ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26390
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| Title: | | Yardstick competition, corruption, and electoral incentives  |
| Authors: | | Long, Ngo Van Sengupta, Bodhisattva |
| Issue Date: | | 2008 |
| Series/Report no.: | | CESifo working paper 2345 |
| Abstract: | | This paper investigates the relationship between electoral incentives, institutions and corruption. We assume that voters use a yardstick criterion. The incumbent provides a public good and extracts rent, which are financed by imposing a distortionary tax. We demonstrate the possibility that yardstick competition itself fails to restrict rent seeking. We complement the static setting with a dynamic scenario where each incumbent politician faces an election after a finite, fixed term. Under relative performance evaluation, dynamic incentives impose more restriction on rent appropriation in comparison to the static case. |
| Subjects: | | Yardstick competition rent-seeking public good electoral incentives |
| JEL: | | H11 H73 H77 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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