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EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26388
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Leininger, Wolfgang | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2008-07-22 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2009-07-28T08:31:16Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2009-07-28T08:31:16Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2008 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26388 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | We define an indirect evolutionary approach formally and apply it to (Tullock) contests. While it is known (Leininger, 2003) that the direct evolutionary approach in the form of finite population ESS (Schaffer, 1988) yields more aggressive behavior than in Nash equilibrium, it is now shown that the indirect evolutionary approach yields the same more aggressive behavior, too. This holds for any population size N, if evolution of preferences is determined by behavior in two-player contests. The evolutionarily stable preferences (ESP) of the indirect approach turn out to be negatively interdependent, thereby rationalizing the more aggressive behavior. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | CESifo München | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | CESifo working paper 2343 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | C79 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D72 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Contests | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | preference evolution | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | evolutionary stability | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Rent Seeking | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Wettbewerb | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Evolutionäre Spieltheorie | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Präferenztheorie | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Evolutionarily stable preferences in contests | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 57226979X | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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