Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26388
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dc.contributor.authorLeininger, Wolfgangen_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-07-22en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:31:16Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:31:16Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26388-
dc.description.abstractWe define an indirect evolutionary approach formally and apply it to (Tullock) contests. While it is known (Leininger, 2003) that the direct evolutionary approach in the form of finite population ESS (Schaffer, 1988) yields more aggressive behavior than in Nash equilibrium, it is now shown that the indirect evolutionary approach yields the same more aggressive behavior, too. This holds for any population size N, if evolution of preferences is determined by behavior in two-player contests. The evolutionarily stable preferences (ESP) of the indirect approach turn out to be negatively interdependent, thereby ”rationalizing” the more aggressive behavior.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo working paper|x2343en_US
dc.subject.jelC79en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordContestsen_US
dc.subject.keywordpreference evolutionen_US
dc.subject.keywordevolutionary stabilityen_US
dc.subject.stwRent Seekingen_US
dc.subject.stwWettbewerben_US
dc.subject.stwEvolutionäre Spieltheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwPräferenztheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleEvolutionarily stable preferences in contestsen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn57226979Xen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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