EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26386
  

Full metadata record

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorSeitz, Helmuten_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-07-22en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:31:15Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:31:15Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26386-
dc.description.abstractThe paper examines the question how fiscally strong and fiscally weak states respond to taxing autonomy at the state level, a subject that is currently under debate in Germany where states do have virtually no power to tax. We use a simple theoretical model that incorporates state surtaxes on the federal income tax bill taking into account fixed costs as well as minimum standards for the provision of public services. We show that both factors work in the direction of forcing fiscally weak states to collect higher surtaxes as compared to fiscally strong states. The empirical section presents evidence on the importance of fixed costs at the state level and calculates the distributional effects of taxing autonomy taking feedbacks of the fiscal equalization system into account. In addition simple estimates of the importance of spending on minimum standards are derived.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper 2341en_US
dc.subject.jelH11en_US
dc.subject.jelH50en_US
dc.subject.jelH71en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordFiscal federalismen_US
dc.subject.keywordminimum standardsen_US
dc.subject.keywordtax autonomyen_US
dc.subject.keywordfiscal equalizationen_US
dc.subject.stwFinanzföderalismusen_US
dc.subject.stwLändersteueren_US
dc.subject.stwSteuerpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwFinanzpolitische Aufgabenverteilungen_US
dc.subject.stwFinanzausgleichen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwDeutschlanden_US
dc.titleMinimum standards, fixed costs and taxing autonomy of subnational governmentsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn572269560en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
572269560.PDF281.71 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Show simple item record
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.