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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26379
  

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dc.contributor.authorChoné, Philippeen_US
dc.contributor.authorLinnemer, Laurenten_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-06-24en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:31:10Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:31:10Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26379-
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines the strategic effects of case preparation in litigation. Specifically, it shows how the pretrial efforts incurred by one party may alter its adversary's incentives to settle. We build a sequential game with one-sided asymmetric information where the informed party first decides to invest, or not, in case preparation, and the uninformed party then makes a settlement offer. Overinvestment, or bluff, always prevails in equilibrium: with positive probability, plaintiffs with weak cases take a chance on investing, and regret it in case of trial. Furthermore, due to the endogenous investment decision, the probability of trial may (locally) decrease with case strength. Overinvestment generates inefficient preparation costs, but may trigger more settlements, thereby reducing trial costs.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper 2334en_US
dc.subject.jelK41en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordCase preparationen_US
dc.subject.keywordsettlementen_US
dc.subject.keywordtrialen_US
dc.subject.keywordsignalingen_US
dc.subject.stwZivilprozessen_US
dc.subject.stwExtensives Spielen_US
dc.subject.stwSchiedsgerichtsbarkeiten_US
dc.subject.stwSignallingen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleOptimal litigation strategies with signaling and screeningen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn57021761Xen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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