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dc.contributor.authorElul, Ronelen_US
dc.contributor.authorGottardi, Pieroen_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-06-06en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:30:54Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:30:54Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26358-
dc.description.abstractIn many countries, lenders are not permitted to use information about past defaults after a specified period of time has elapsed. We model this provision and determine conditions under which it is optimal. We develop a model in which entrepreneurs must repeatedly seek external funds to finance a sequence of risky projects under conditions of both adverse selection and moral hazard. Forgetting a default typically makes incentives worse, ex-ante, because it reduces the punishment for failure. However, following a default it may be good to forget, because by improving an entrepreneur’s reputation, forgetting increases the incentive to exert effort to preserve this reputation. Our key result is that if (i) borrowers’ incentives are sufficiently strong, (ii) their average quality is not too low, (iii) the output loss from low effort is not too large, and (iv) agents are sufficiently patient, then the optimal law would prescribe some amount of forgetting — that is, it would not permit lenders to fully utilize past information. We also argue that forgetting must be the outcome of a regulatory intervention by the government — no lender would willingly agree to ignore information available to him. Finally, we show that the predictions of our model are consistent with the cross-country relationship between credit bureau reporting regulations and the provision of credit, as well as Musto (2004)’s evidence on the impact of these regulations on individual borrower and lender behavior.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper 2313en_US
dc.subject.jelD86en_US
dc.subject.jelG33en_US
dc.subject.jelK35en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordtax competitionen_US
dc.subject.keywordtrade unionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordforeign direct investmenten_US
dc.subject.stwKonkursen_US
dc.subject.stwZeiten_US
dc.subject.stwUnternehmensgründungen_US
dc.subject.stwFinanzierungen_US
dc.subject.stwAdverse Selectionen_US
dc.subject.stwMoral Hazarden_US
dc.subject.stwUnternehmeren_US
dc.subject.stwÖkonomischer Anreizen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleBankruptcy: is it enough to forgive or must we also forget?en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn568606469en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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