Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/26315 
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dc.contributor.authorBolton, Gary E.en
dc.contributor.authorLoebbecke, Claudiaen
dc.contributor.authorOckenfels, Axelen
dc.date.accessioned2008-04-11-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:30:21Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:30:21Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26315-
dc.description.abstractMany Internet markets rely on feedback systems', essentially social networks of reputation, to facilitate trust and trustworthiness in anonymous transactions. Market competition creates incentives that arguably may enhance or curb the effectiveness of these systems. We investigate how different forms of market competition and social reputation networks interact in a series of laboratory online markets, where sellers face a moral hazard. We find that competition in strangers networks (where market encounters are one-shot) most frequently enhances trust and trustworthiness, and always increases total gains-from-trade. One reason is that information about reputation trumps pricing in the sense that traders usually do not conduct business with someone having a bad reputation not even for a substantial price discount. We also find that a reliable reputation network can largely reduce the advantage of partners networks (where a buyer and a seller can maintain repeated exchange with each other) in promoting trust and trustworthiness if the market is sufficiently competitive. We conclude that, overall, competitive online markets have more effective social reputation networks.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x2270en
dc.subject.jelD44en
dc.subject.jelL14en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordreputation systemsen
dc.subject.keyworde-commerceen
dc.subject.keywordinternet marketsen
dc.subject.keywordtrusten
dc.subject.stwE-Businessen
dc.subject.stwInterneten
dc.subject.stwVertrauenen
dc.subject.stwSoziales Netzwerken
dc.subject.stwWettbewerben
dc.subject.stwTesten
dc.titleHow social reputation networks interact with competition in anonymous online trading: an experimental study-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn561444250en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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