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dc.contributor.authorBolton, Gary E.en_US
dc.contributor.authorLoebbecke, Claudiaen_US
dc.contributor.authorOckenfels, Axelen_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-04-11en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:30:21Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:30:21Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26315-
dc.description.abstractMany Internet markets rely on ‘feedback systems’, essentially social networks of reputation, to facilitate trust and trustworthiness in anonymous transactions. Market competition creates incentives that arguably may enhance or curb the effectiveness of these systems. We investigate how different forms of market competition and social reputation networks interact in a series of laboratory online markets, where sellers face a moral hazard. We find that competition in strangers networks (where market encounters are one-shot) most frequently enhances trust and trustworthiness, and always increases total gains-from-trade. One reason is that information about reputation trumps pricing in the sense that traders usually do not conduct business with someone having a bad reputation not even for a substantial price discount. We also find that a reliable reputation network can largely reduce the advantage of partners networks (where a buyer and a seller can maintain repeated exchange with each other) in promoting trust and trustworthiness if the market is sufficiently competitive. We conclude that, overall, competitive online markets have more effective social reputation networks.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper 2270en_US
dc.subject.jelD44en_US
dc.subject.jelL14en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordreputation systemsen_US
dc.subject.keyworde-commerceen_US
dc.subject.keywordinternet marketsen_US
dc.subject.keywordtrusten_US
dc.subject.stwE-Businessen_US
dc.subject.stwInterneten_US
dc.subject.stwVertrauenen_US
dc.subject.stwSoziales Netzwerken_US
dc.subject.stwWettbewerben_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.titleHow social reputation networks interact with competition in anonymous online trading: an experimental studyen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn561444250en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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