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dc.contributor.authorKind, Hans Jarleen_US
dc.contributor.authorKoethenbuerger, Markoen_US
dc.contributor.authorSchjelderup, Guttormen_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-03-28en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:30:16Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:30:16Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26307-
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines the efficient provision of goods in two-sided markets and characterizes optimal specific and ad-valorem taxes. We show that (i) a monopoly may have too high output compared to the social optimum; (ii) output may be reduced by imposing negative value-added taxes (subsidy) or positive specific taxes.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper 2262en_US
dc.subject.jelD4en_US
dc.subject.jelD43en_US
dc.subject.jelH21en_US
dc.subject.jelH22en_US
dc.subject.jelL13en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwOptimale Besteuerungen_US
dc.subject.stwSubventionen_US
dc.subject.stwMonopolen_US
dc.subject.stwWirtschaftliche Effizienzen_US
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtseffekten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleEfficiency enhancing taxation in two-sided marketsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn560540051en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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