EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26307
  
Title:Efficiency enhancing taxation in two-sided markets PDF Logo
Authors:Kind, Hans Jarle
Koethenbuerger, Marko
Schjelderup, Guttorm
Issue Date:2008
Series/Report no.:CESifo working paper 2262
Abstract:This paper examines the efficient provision of goods in two-sided markets and characterizes optimal specific and ad-valorem taxes. We show that (i) a monopoly may have too high output compared to the social optimum; (ii) output may be reduced by imposing negative value-added taxes (subsidy) or positive specific taxes.
JEL:D4
D43
H21
H22
L13
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
560540051.PDF246.99 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26307

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.