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EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26293
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Bellettini, Giorgio | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Kempf, Hubert | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2008-03-27 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2009-07-28T08:30:06Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2009-07-28T08:30:06Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2008 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26293 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | In this paper, we tackle the issue of locating a public facility which provides a public good in a closed and populated territory. This facility generates differentiated benefits to neighborhoods depending on their distance from it. In the case of a Nimby facility, the smaller is the distance, the lower is the individual benefit. The opposite is true in the case of an anti-Nimby facility. We first characterize the optimal location which would be chosen by a social planner. Then we introduce a common-agency lobbying game, where agents attempt to influence the location and provision decisions by the government. Some interesting results arise in the case where only a subset of neighborhoods lobby. First, the solution of the lobbying game can replicate the optimal solution. Second, under-provision and over-provision of the public good may be obtained both in the Nimby and the anti-Nimby cases. The provision outcome depends on the presence of either a congestion effect or an agglomeration effect. Third, some non-lobbying neighborhoods may be better off than in the case where all neighborhoods lobby, which raises the possibility of free-riding at the lobbying stage. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | CESifo München | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | CESifo working paper 2248 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | R00 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Öffentliche Einrichtung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Standortwahl | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Öffentliches Gut | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Externer Effekt | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Interessenpolitik | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Public Choice | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Spieltheorie | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Why not in your backyard?: on the location and size of a public facility | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 560499094 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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