Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/26293 
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dc.contributor.authorBellettini, Giorgioen
dc.contributor.authorKempf, Huberten
dc.date.accessioned2008-03-27-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:30:06Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:30:06Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26293-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, we tackle the issue of locating a public facility which provides a public good in a closed and populated territory. This facility generates differentiated benefits to neighborhoods depending on their distance from it. In the case of a Nimby facility, the smaller is the distance, the lower is the individual benefit. The opposite is true in the case of an anti-Nimby facility. We first characterize the optimal location which would be chosen by a social planner. Then we introduce a common-agency lobbying game, where agents attempt to influence the location and provision decisions by the government. Some interesting results arise in the case where only a subset of neighborhoods lobby. First, the solution of the lobbying game can replicate the optimal solution. Second, under-provision and over-provision of the public good may be obtained both in the Nimby and the anti-Nimby cases. The provision outcome depends on the presence of either a congestion effect or an agglomeration effect. Third, some non-lobbying neighborhoods may be better off than in the case where all neighborhoods lobby, which raises the possibility of free-riding at the lobbying stage.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x2248en
dc.subject.jelR00en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.stwÖffentliche Einrichtungen
dc.subject.stwStandortwahlen
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten
dc.subject.stwExterner Effekten
dc.subject.stwInteressenpolitiken
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleWhy not in your backyard?: on the location and size of a public facility-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn560499094en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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