Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26290
Authors: 
van Aaken, Anne
Feld, Lars P.
Voigt, Stefan
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo working paper 2245
Abstract: 
It is hypothesized that prosecution agencies that are dependent on the executive have less incentives to prosecute crimes committed by government members which, in turn, increases their incentives to commit such crimes. Here, this hypothesis is put to an empirical test focusing on a particular kind of crime, namely corruption. In order to test it, it was necessary to create an indicator measuring de jure as well as de facto independence of the prosecution agencies. The regressions show that de facto independence of prosecution agencies robustly reduces corruption of officials.
Subjects: 
corruption
prosecution agencies
judicial independence and positive constitutional economics
JEL: 
H11
K40
K42
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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