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ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26290
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| Title: | | Power over prosecutors corrupts politicians: cross country evidence using a new indicator  |
| Authors: | | van Aaken, Anne Feld, Lars P. Voigt, Stefan |
| Issue Date: | | 2008 |
| Series/Report no.: | | CESifo working paper 2245 |
| Abstract: | | It is hypothesized that prosecution agencies that are dependent on the executive have less incentives to prosecute crimes committed by government members which, in turn, increases their incentives to commit such crimes. Here, this hypothesis is put to an empirical test focusing on a particular kind of crime, namely corruption. In order to test it, it was necessary to create an indicator measuring de jure as well as de facto independence of the prosecution agencies. The regressions show that de facto independence of prosecution agencies robustly reduces corruption of officials. |
| Subjects: | | corruption prosecution agencies judicial independence and positive constitutional economics |
| JEL: | | H11 K40 K42 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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