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dc.contributor.authorBolton, Gary E.en_US
dc.contributor.authorOckenfels, Axelen_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-03-06en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:30:01Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:30:01Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26286-
dc.description.abstractWe conducted a controlled field experiment on eBay and examined to what extent both social and competitive laboratory behavior is robust to institutionally complex real world markets with experienced traders, who selected themselves into these markets. EBay’s natural trading system provides bridges between lab and field environment that can be exploited to explore differences in behavior in the two environments. We find that many sellers do not make use of their commitment power as predicted by standard theories of both selfish and social behavior. However, a concern for equity strongly affects outcomes and reputation building in bilateral bargaining, while buyer competition effectively masks this concern and robustly yields equilibrium outcomes. The dichotomy of behaviors mirrors observations in laboratory research. Furthermore, we find that behavioral patterns in the field experiment mirror fully naturally occurring trading patterns in the market.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper 2241en_US
dc.subject.jelC93en_US
dc.subject.jelD44en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordeBayen_US
dc.subject.keywordauctionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordbehavioral economicsen_US
dc.subject.keywordtrusten_US
dc.subject.keywordmarket designen_US
dc.subject.stwAuktionen_US
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwVerhaltensökonomiken_US
dc.subject.stwVertrauenen_US
dc.subject.stwMarktmechanismusen_US
dc.subject.stwGerechtigkeiten_US
dc.subject.stwWettbewerben_US
dc.subject.stwUSAen_US
dc.titleDoes laboratory trading mirror behavior in real world markets?: fair bargaining and competitive bidding on EBayen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn559514700en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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