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dc.contributor.authorBiancini, Saraen_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-02-20en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:29:37Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:29:37Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26254-
dc.description.abstractWe consider the regulation of national firms in a common market. Regulators can influence the production of national firms but they incur in a positive cost of public funds. First, we show that market integration is welfare improving if and only if the efficiency gains compensate for the negative public finance effect (related to business stealing). We also show that supranational competition can have very different consequences on the rent seeking behaviour of firms, depending on cost correlation and ex-ante technological risk. Finally, we characterize the global optimum and show how it can be sustained in a decentralized bargaining solution.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper 2209en_US
dc.subject.jelL43en_US
dc.subject.jelL51en_US
dc.subject.jelF15en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordregulationen_US
dc.subject.keywordcompetitionen_US
dc.subject.keywordmarket integrationen_US
dc.subject.keywordcost of public fundsen_US
dc.subject.stwMarktintegrationen_US
dc.subject.stwRegulierungen_US
dc.subject.stwWettbewerben_US
dc.subject.stwMakroökonomischer Einflussen_US
dc.subject.stwGesamtwirtschaftliches Anlagevermögenen_US
dc.subject.stwAgency Theoryen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleRegulating national firms in a common marketen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn558657346en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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