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dc.contributor.authorDalle Nogare, Chiaraen_US
dc.contributor.authorRicciuti, Robertoen_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-02-14en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:29:30Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:29:30Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26244-
dc.description.abstractAccording to reputational models of political economy, a term limit may change the behavior of a chief executive because he does not have to stand for election. We test this hypothesis in a sample of 52 countries over the period 1977-2000, using government spending, social and welfare spending and deficit as policy choice variables using panel data estimation techniques. We are unable to find significant differences in the behavior of term-limited and non term-limited chief executives. This is in contrast with some previous empirical results based on U.S. states and international data.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper 2199en_US
dc.subject.jelE62en_US
dc.subject.jelH11en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordterm limitsen_US
dc.subject.keywordcomparative politicsen_US
dc.subject.keywordfiscal policyen_US
dc.subject.stwFinanzpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwRegelgebundene Politiken_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentliche Schuldenen_US
dc.subject.stwSystemvergleichen_US
dc.subject.stwSchätzungen_US
dc.subject.stwUSAen_US
dc.subject.stwWelten_US
dc.titleTerm limits: do they really affect fiscal policy choices?en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn558346324en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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