Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26244
Authors: 
Dalle Nogare, Chiara
Ricciuti, Roberto
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo working paper 2199
Abstract: 
According to reputational models of political economy, a term limit may change the behavior of a chief executive because he does not have to stand for election. We test this hypothesis in a sample of 52 countries over the period 1977-2000, using government spending, social and welfare spending and deficit as policy choice variables using panel data estimation techniques. We are unable to find significant differences in the behavior of term-limited and non term-limited chief executives. This is in contrast with some previous empirical results based on U.S. states and international data.
Subjects: 
term limits
comparative politics
fiscal policy
JEL: 
E62
H11
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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