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EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26243
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Gersbach, Hans | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Fahrenberger, Theresa | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2008-02-14 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2009-07-28T08:29:29Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2009-07-28T08:29:29Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2008 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26243 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | In this paper we propose minority voting as a scheme that can partially protect individuals from the risk of repeated exploitation. We consider a committee that meets twice to decide about projects where the first-period project may have a long-lasting impact. In the first period a simple open majority voting scheme takes place. Voting splits the committee into three groups: voting winners, voting losers, and absentees. Under minority voting only voting losers keep the voting right in the second period. We show that as soon as absolute risk aversion exceeds a threshold value minority voting is superior to repeated application of the simple majority rule. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | CESifo München | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | CESifo working paper 2198 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D7 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | voting | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | minority | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | durable decision | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | risk aversion | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | tyranny of majority rules | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Abstimmungsregel | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Minderheit | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Wahlsystem | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Zeitkonsistenz | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Risikoaversion | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Public Choice | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Minority voting and long-term decisions | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 558345530 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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