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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26243
  

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dc.contributor.authorGersbach, Hansen_US
dc.contributor.authorFahrenberger, Theresaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-02-14en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:29:29Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:29:29Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26243-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we propose minority voting as a scheme that can partially protect individuals from the risk of repeated exploitation. We consider a committee that meets twice to decide about projects where the first-period project may have a long-lasting impact. In the first period a simple open majority voting scheme takes place. Voting splits the committee into three groups: voting winners, voting losers, and absentees. Under minority voting only voting losers keep the voting right in the second period. We show that as soon as absolute risk aversion exceeds a threshold value minority voting is superior to repeated application of the simple majority rule.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper 2198en_US
dc.subject.jelD7en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordvotingen_US
dc.subject.keywordminorityen_US
dc.subject.keyworddurable decisionen_US
dc.subject.keywordrisk aversionen_US
dc.subject.keywordtyranny of majority rulesen_US
dc.subject.stwAbstimmungsregelen_US
dc.subject.stwMinderheiten_US
dc.subject.stwWahlsystemen_US
dc.subject.stwZeitkonsistenzen_US
dc.subject.stwRisikoaversionen_US
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen_US
dc.titleMinority voting and long-term decisionsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn558345530en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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