|
EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26243
|
| | |
| Title: | | Minority voting and long-term decisions  |
| Authors: | | Gersbach, Hans Fahrenberger, Theresa |
| Issue Date: | | 2008 |
| Series/Report no.: | | CESifo working paper 2198 |
| Abstract: | | In this paper we propose minority voting as a scheme that can partially protect individuals from the risk of repeated exploitation. We consider a committee that meets twice to decide about projects where the first-period project may have a long-lasting impact. In the first period a simple open majority voting scheme takes place. Voting splits the committee into three groups: voting winners, voting losers, and absentees. Under minority voting only voting losers keep the voting right in the second period. We show that as soon as absolute risk aversion exceeds a threshold value minority voting is superior to repeated application of the simple majority rule. |
| Subjects: | | voting minority durable decision risk aversion tyranny of majority rules |
| JEL: | | D7 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
|
| |
| | |
Download bibliographical data as:
BibTeX
|
| |
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26243
|
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|