Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/26240 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 2195
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
This paper deals with the voting rules in the EU Council. Both internal and external impact of the voting rules are evaluated. Internal impact affects the distribution of power among the member states and external impact affects power relations between the main decision-making bodies in the EU. One of the main lessons of the analysis is clearly to explain why the design of Council voting rules has required so much bargaining and cumbersome marathon negotiations.
Subjects: 
European integration
Council of Ministers
power
JEL: 
C70
D71
H77
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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