EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26237
  

Full metadata record

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorBouckaert, Janen_US
dc.contributor.authorDegryse, Hansen_US
dc.contributor.authorDijk, Theon vanen_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-02-14en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:29:25Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:29:25Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26237-
dc.description.abstractCompetition authorities and regulatory agencies sometimes impose pricing restrictions on firms with substantial market power — the “dominant” firms. We analyze the welfare effects of a ban on behaviour-based price discrimination in a two-period setting where the market displays a competitive and a sheltered segment. A ban on “higher-prices-to-sheltered-consumers” decreases prices in the sheltered segment, relaxes competition in the competitive segment, increases the rival’s profits, and may harm the dominant firm’s profits. We show that a ban on “higher-prices-to-sheltered-consumers” increases the dominant firm’s share of the first-period market. A ban on “lower-prices-to-rival’s-customers” decreases prices in the competitive segment, lowers the rival’s profits, and augments the consumer surplus. In particular, while second-period competition is relaxed by a ban on “lower-prices-to-rival’s-customers”, first-period competition is intensified substantially, which leads to lower prices “on-average” over the two periods. Our findings indicate that a dynamic two-period analysis may lead to conclusions opposite to those drawn from a static one-period analysis.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper 2192en_US
dc.subject.jelD11en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keyworddominant firmsen_US
dc.subject.keywordprice discriminationen_US
dc.subject.keywordcompetition policyen_US
dc.subject.keywordregulationen_US
dc.subject.stwPreisdifferenzierungen_US
dc.subject.stwMarktmachten_US
dc.subject.stwPreisaufsichten_US
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtseffekten_US
dc.subject.stwWettbewerbstheorieen_US
dc.titlePrice discrimination bans on dominant firmsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn558341187en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
558341187.PDF604.26 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Show simple item record
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.