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EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26237
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Bouckaert, Jan | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Degryse, Hans | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Dijk, Theon van | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2008-02-14 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2009-07-28T08:29:25Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2009-07-28T08:29:25Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2008 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26237 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | Competition authorities and regulatory agencies sometimes impose pricing restrictions on firms with substantial market power the dominant firms. We analyze the welfare effects of a ban on behaviour-based price discrimination in a two-period setting where the market displays a competitive and a sheltered segment. A ban on higher-prices-to-sheltered-consumers decreases prices in the sheltered segment, relaxes competition in the competitive segment, increases the rivals profits, and may harm the dominant firms profits. We show that a ban on higher-prices-to-sheltered-consumers increases the dominant firms share of the first-period market. A ban on lower-prices-to-rivals-customers decreases prices in the competitive segment, lowers the rivals profits, and augments the consumer surplus. In particular, while second-period competition is relaxed by a ban on lower-prices-to-rivals-customers, first-period competition is intensified substantially, which leads to lower prices on-average over the two periods. Our findings indicate that a dynamic two-period analysis may lead to conclusions opposite to those drawn from a static one-period analysis. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | CESifo München | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | CESifo working paper 2192 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D11 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | dominant firms | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | price discrimination | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | competition policy | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | regulation | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Preisdifferenzierung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Marktmacht | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Preisaufsicht | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Wohlfahrtseffekt | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Wettbewerbstheorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Price discrimination bans on dominant firms | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 558341187 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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