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Title:The penalty-duel and institutional design: is there a Neeskens-effect? PDF Logo
Authors:Leininger, Wolfgang
Ockenfels, Axel
Issue Date:2008
Series/Report no.:CESifo working paper 2187
Abstract:No abstract available
game theory
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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