Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26213
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dc.contributor.authorMatsen, Egilen_US
dc.contributor.authorThøgersen, Øysteinen_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-02-07en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:29:07Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:29:07Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26213-
dc.description.abstractWe suggest a probabilistic voting model where voters’ preferences for alternative public goods display habit formation. Current policies determine habit levels and in turn the future preferences of the voters. This allows the incumbent to act strategically in order to influence the probability of re-election. Comparing to a benchmark case of a certain re-election, we demonstrate that the incumbent’s optimal policy features both a more polarized allocation between the alternative public goods and a debt bias.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo working paper|x2169en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.jelD78en_US
dc.subject.jelH62en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordbudget deficitsen_US
dc.subject.keywordvotingen_US
dc.subject.keywordextremismen_US
dc.subject.keywordhabit formationen_US
dc.subject.stwPolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwIdeologieen_US
dc.subject.stwWahlverhaltenen_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentliche Ausgabenen_US
dc.subject.stwHaushaltsdefiziten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleHabit formation, strategic extremism and debt policyen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn557979080en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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