Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/26187 
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dc.contributor.authorCigno, Alessandroen
dc.date.accessioned2008-02-06-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:28:49Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:28:49Z-
dc.date.issued2007-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26187-
dc.description.abstractDecisions concerning marriage, fertility, participation, and the education of children are explained using a two-stage game-theoretical model. The paper examines the effects of (i) family law (cost of obtaining a divorce, alimony, availability of quasi-marriages such as PACS in France, and civil partnership in the UK), (ii) legislation concerning the assignment of property rights over total goods and assets acquired within marriage, (iii) enforceability of bride-price contracts, and (iv) length and effective enforcement of compulsory education. The predictions are consistent with two empirical observations. One is that, the tendency in developed countries is towards mother and father sharing market work and the care of the children equally between them, while the predominant pattern in developing countries is for the father to specialize in market work leaving the care of the children to the mother. The other is that the sign of the cross-country correlation between fertility and female labour market participation, negative until the mid-1970s, has turned positive where developed, but not developing countries are concerned since that date. The model provides a gender-neutral explanation of why girls in developing countries tend to get less education than boys of the same educational ability, and of why a substantial minority of women in some developed countries work and earn more than their male partners. We also derive and discuss the implications of a number of normative propositions.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x2143en
dc.subject.jelD13en
dc.subject.jelJ12en
dc.subject.jelJ13en
dc.subject.jelJ24en
dc.subject.jelK39en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordgenderen
dc.subject.keywordeducationen
dc.subject.keywordlabour participationen
dc.subject.keywordfertilityen
dc.subject.keywordcivil partnershipen
dc.subject.keywordmarriageen
dc.subject.keyworddivorceen
dc.subject.keywordalimonyen
dc.subject.keyworddowryen
dc.subject.keywordbride-priceen
dc.subject.keywordschool-leaving ageen
dc.subject.stwRechtsordnungen
dc.subject.stwFamilienplanungen
dc.subject.stwErwerbstätigkeiten
dc.subject.stwFruchtbarkeiten
dc.subject.stwPrivater Haushalten
dc.subject.stwBildungsniveauen
dc.subject.stwKinderen
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtstheorieen
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen
dc.titleA theoretical analysis of the effects of legislation on marriage, fertility, domestic division of labour, and the education of children-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn557917697en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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