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dc.contributor.authorCigno, Alessandroen_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-02-06en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:28:49Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:28:49Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26187-
dc.description.abstractDecisions concerning marriage, fertility, participation, and the education of children are explained using a two-stage game-theoretical model. The paper examines the effects of (i) family law (cost of obtaining a divorce, alimony, availability of quasi-marriages such as PACS in France, and civil partnership in the UK), (ii) legislation concerning the assignment of property rights over total goods and assets acquired within marriage, (iii) enforceability of bride-price contracts, and (iv) length and effective enforcement of compulsory education. The predictions are consistent with two empirical observations. One is that, the tendency in developed countries is towards mother and father sharing market work and the care of the children equally between them, while the predominant pattern in developing countries is for the father to specialize in market work leaving the care of the children to the mother. The other is that the sign of the cross-country correlation between fertility and female labour market participation, negative until the mid-1970s, has turned positive where developed, but not developing countries are concerned since that date. The model provides a gender-neutral explanation of why girls in developing countries tend to get less education than boys of the same educational ability, and of why a substantial minority of women in some developed countries work and earn more than their male partners. We also derive and discuss the implications of a number of normative propositions.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper 2143en_US
dc.subject.jelD13en_US
dc.subject.jelJ12en_US
dc.subject.jelJ13en_US
dc.subject.jelJ24en_US
dc.subject.jelK39en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordgenderen_US
dc.subject.keywordeducationen_US
dc.subject.keywordlabour participationen_US
dc.subject.keywordfertilityen_US
dc.subject.keywordcivil partnershipen_US
dc.subject.keywordmarriageen_US
dc.subject.keyworddivorceen_US
dc.subject.keywordalimonyen_US
dc.subject.keyworddowryen_US
dc.subject.keywordbride-priceen_US
dc.subject.keywordschool-leaving ageen_US
dc.subject.stwRechtsordnungen_US
dc.subject.stwFamilienplanungen_US
dc.subject.stwErwerbstätigkeiten_US
dc.subject.stwFruchtbarkeiten_US
dc.subject.stwPrivater Haushalten_US
dc.subject.stwBildungsniveauen_US
dc.subject.stwKinderen_US
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.titleA theoretical analysis of the effects of legislation on marriage, fertility, domestic division of labour, and the education of childrenen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn557917697en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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