Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26181
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dc.contributor.authorBrueckner, Jan Keithen_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-02-06en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:28:44Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:28:44Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26181-
dc.description.abstractThe fiscal decentralization impulse now sweeping the world often leads to partial decentralization, where subnational governments are funded by central transfers, rather than leading to full local autonomy. Despite the practical important of this arrangement, the literature contains no economic analysis of a partial decentralization regime in a Tiebout-style model. This paper provides such an analysis, relying on the key assumption that public-good provision requires effort on the part of government officials. By choosing different degrees of effort, localities can then provide different public-good levels even when a fixed, common transfer constrains them to spend the same amount. A number of useful results are derived.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo working paper|x2137en_US
dc.subject.jelH1en_US
dc.subject.jelH7en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwFiskalische Dezentralisierungen_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten_US
dc.subject.stwInstitutioneller Wettbewerben_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titlePartial fiscal decentralizationen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn557909325en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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